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The meaning of ”animal” is contested. This struggle is vitally important - by
defining the word, we are also trying to define the world. The power of definition
becomes especially evident when we run across descriptions that simply do not
correspond with our own understandings. For example, much cited because it
is such a captivating example,1 Michel Foucault quotes a Chinese encyclopedia:
Animals are divided into: a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) em-
balmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innu-
merable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) et cetera,
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way
off look like flies.
Recounting his reaction to that passage, he ably characterizes the heart of social
construction theory:
In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as
the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of
our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (1970, p. xv)
So begins his Archaeology of the Human Sciences in which he demonstrates
that the categories and concepts which we treat as truths are not as universal as
they may at first seem. This notion can be difficult to grasp. As Neil Evernden
illustrates:
A medium is invisible to an organism until it is removed from it: Wa-
ter is unknown to a fish until it discovers air. Our cultural medium
is similarly transparent, and as a consequence we accept as common
sense what persons in other cultures might find incredible. (1985, p.
48)
Social construction theories gained considerable currency in semiotics, the sci-
ence of signs or in what, as Terence Hawkes asserts, could just as accurately be
called the study of communication. (1977, pp. 123-4) In a simplistic nutshell,
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social construction theories challenge the notion of an objective knowledge of
”truths” out there waiting to be discovered by the diligent and written by the
insightful. Raman Selden, in his description of poststructuralist theories, quotes
Nietzsche: ”Ultimately, man [sic] finds in things nothing but what he himself
has imported into them.” And what is imported very much reflects the times.
Selden concludes:
People recognize a particular piece of philosophy or scientific theory
as ‘true’ only if it fits the descriptions of truth laid down by the
intellectual or political authorities of the day, by members of the
ruling elite, or by the prevailing ideologues of knowledge. (1989, p.
100)
Thus the study of scientific, philosophical, or any other discourse quickly be-
comes the study of power, for ”discourse determines what it is possible to say,
what are the criteria of ‘truth’, who is allowed to speak with authority, and
where such speech can be spoken.” ( 1989, p. 16)
These theories have obvious implications beyond the realm of literary theory
and are now bandied about in a variety of academic disciplines, especially those
concerned with power relations. Christopher Norris notes that deconstruction
has ”become something of a buzzword among commentators on the postmodern
cultural scene. It is a term that now comes readily to novelists, politicians, media
pundits, pop journalists, TV presenters, newspaper columnists ...and others with
an eye to intellectual fashion or a taste for debunking such pretentious jargon.”
He bemoans these popular uses of the word, however, classifying them as ”a
species of out-and-out hermeneutic license, a pretext for critics to indulge any
kind of whimsical, free-wheeling or ‘creative’ commentary that happens to take
their fancy.” ( 1991, p. 136, 138)
Such unwillingness to define terms is one of the characteristics of post-modernism.
Thus it is not surprising that ”there are as many postmodernisms as theorist-
s.” (Selden,1989, p. 74) Post-modern deconstructionism, however it may be
defined, has certainly found its way into ecosophy circles. What follows is an
exploration of how some aspects of social construction theories are relevant to
how we study other animals and our subsequent relations with them.
The Other
Central to deconstructionism is the concept of the Other, the concentration on
differences rather than similarities, on self-creation and self-definition based on
what’s ”not-me.” In Selden’s words: ”We define our identities always in relation
to what we are not, and therefore what we are not... must be demonized and
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objectified.” ( 1989, p. 107) Being able to conceive of an Other has been a
central concern for many ecosophers. For example, just as Foucault reminds
us that the concept of ”Man” has not been with humans forever, so too does
Morris Berman discuss the rise of the concept of ”Nature”:
The view of nature which predominated in the West down to the eve
of the Scientific Revolution was that of an enchanted world. Rocks,
trees, rivers, and clouds were seen as wondrous, alive, and human
beings felt at home in this environment.... The story of the modern
epoch, at least on the level of mind, is one of progressive disenchant-
ment .... for it insists on a rigid distinction between observer and
observed. Scientific consciousness is alienated consciousness; there
is no ecstatic merger with nature, but rather total separation from
it. (1981, pp. 2-3)
Not only does nature then become separate from human, but as Barbara Noske
points out: ”Nature has become the Other and the lesser.” ( 1989, p. 41)
Still, as both Foucault and Berman indicate, although the ability to conceive of
the ”Other,” ”Man,” and ”Nature” is a source of alienation, we cannot simply
return to a pre-Cartesian, medieval worldview. We can, however, begin the
healing process by acknowledging that while
there is a sense in which we cannot know the Other (whether it be other species,
other cultures, the other sex or even each other), we must remind ourselves that
other meanings exist, even if we may be severely limited in our understanding
of them. (Noske,1989, p. 160)
The Other as Sub-Human
The search for other meanings is the premise of Donna Haraway’s remarkable
deconstruction of primatology, Primate Visions, a particularly fruitful source
for discussions on the epistemology of science. Describing why she chose pri-
matology as her subject rather than other disciplines in science, Haraway notes
that ”monkeys and apes, and human beings as their taxonomic kin, exist on the
boundaries of so many struggles to determine what will count as knowledge.” (
1989, p. 13)
It was particularly fortuitous for me that Haraway chose primatology as her
source of reflection. As a former student of psychology, with an emphasis on
animal behavior, I came to her book with all of the baggage acquired from such
studies. I rarely questioned in my undergraduate years the findings of primatol-
ogists. (For example, although I do recall being nauseated by Harry Harlow’s
sadistic experiments in which he orphaned rhesus monkeys, I did not doubt the
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validity of his conclusions on mother love). I swallowed the ”data” hook, line
and sinker as every good student in that particular school should. I was some-
what aware of how ideologies affected other disciplines (like those ”soft” social
sciences and other branches of psychology), but I was secure in the knowledge
that primatology was sufficiently objective to be beyond reproach. Since then,
I have had opportunity to critically reflect on some of my foundational beliefs.
To build her argument, Haraway writes about a few key figures in the history of
primatology to illustrate how they, like everyone else, are very much products
of their culture, and hence interpreted the life of the primates they studied
in certain ways. A particularly telling example is that of the study of the
famous Koko, the captive gorilla who learned American Sign Language. Koko
has been an exciting case study for many reasons, including her ability to use
sign language in a way which implies self-awareness. For example, she signs
that she is a ”fine gorilla animal” (i.e., not a human), recognizes herself in a
mirror and even takes photographs of herself. Of particular interest to Haraway
was Koko’s keeping of a pet cat. As Haraway illustrates, keeping a pet cat is
not something that all humans do (some cultures eat cats), and thus Koko is a
North American gorilla, carrying the baggage for a Western society.
These language experiments, of which Koko is part, indicate an attempt to
understand ourselves via the Other. As Noske illustrates, such language experi-
ments often reflect human desires to prove our uniqueness: ”The basic question
should not be whether animals have or have not human-like language. In hav-
ing to pass our tests as measured by our yardsticks, they will always come out
second best, namely, as reduced humans.” ( 1989, pp. 143-4) And when non-
humans do pass our I.Q. tests, this does not mean that the animals might be
considered intelligent. Rather, the test must not have been difficult enough!
Noske writes:
Once tool-making had been discovered among chimpanzees, social
scientists found themselves in a rather awkward position....They
clearly had underestimated the ape’s technical skills when defin-
ing the uniqueness of humanity. As a result the onus of humanness
quickly shifted from making tools to using a tool to make another
tool, so as to safeguard human-animal discontinuity. (1989, p. 152)
Thus the animals can always be judged as sub-human. And as Haraway notes,
they will also be sub-humans of a particular human culture.2
It is important to note that there is no overt conspiracy in what gets to count as
knowledge in primatology. In other words, it isn’t about a bunch of white neo-
colonialists sitting in a room together plotting how they are going to interpret
the lives of non-human primates. Instead Haraway, like Foucault, stresses that
we are all caught up in Bentham’s panopticon, that we are all part of this
society and thus susceptible to the dominant ideologies. ”It is at the level of
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fundamental theory and practice, not at the level of good guys and bad guys.”
( 1991, p. 68)
Objectivity and Progress
To illustrate her concerns about the ideology of objectivity, Haraway briefly
explores Japanese primatology. Japanese concepts of the human/animal/nature
relationship are different from typical Western approaches. In this context,
unlike in North America, ”nature cannot be constructed as a health spa for
the ills of industrial society” nor can ”the story of Adam’s commission in the
Garden as planetary park ranger, with the special power to name his charges”
be possible in Japan. (1989, pp. 246,247)
Too, the distinction between observer and observed, so important to Western
sciences, is fuzzier hence less time is spent in trying to pretend to be distant
and separate from the study animals. Japanese primatologists are unconcerned
that they provision monkeys to ease their observations nor are they troubled
by becoming attached to them. In fact, they ”preferred to call their method
‘anthropomorphic,’ stressing their assumption that since monkeys have ‘minds’
of some sort, some kind of empathic method would be reasonable and likely
required to understand simian societies.” ( 1989, p. 252)
This emphasis on empathy gets to a key point in social construction theory: the
importance of context. Hawkes writes:
...every perceiver’s method of perceiving can be shown to contain an
inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant degree.
A wholly objective perception of individual entities is therefore not
possible: any observer is bound to create something of what he ob-
serves. Accordingly, the relationship between observer and observed
achieves a kind of primacy. (1977, p. 17)
Thus the divide between subject and object so important to empiricism is chal-
lenged.
This, of course, shakes the foundations of objectivity in science. Not that this
is the first shaking to be done; there is a whole literature devoted to challenging
traditional scientific tenets, particularly from a feminist perspective. Still, as
Charles Bergman notes: ”Objectivity in science is a relatively easy target to
knock off; the wonder is how tenaciously we continue to believe in it.” ( 1990,
p. 27) Indeed, scientists in our society achieve god-like status and are seen
as ”subjects apprehending objects through the blank mirror of the senses.” (
Selden, 1989, p. 76) These gods are not easily dethroned. We find it hard to
remember that, as R. C. Lewontin reminds us:
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Scientists do not begin life as scientists, after all, but as social be-
ings immersed in a family, a state, a productive structure, and they
view nature through a lens that has been molded by their social
experiences. (1991, p. 3)
The Japanese empathetic approaches, then, can be seen as attractive because
of their cognizance of the importance of relationships. When Haraway describes
Japanese primatology, however, she is not being prescriptive, suggesting that
we jump on the oriental spiritual bandwagon and assume that these approaches
are therefore less cruel to other animals and more appropriate for conservation;
Japan’s record on both fronts is not particularly encouraging. Instead, it is
important to recognize that other approaches, stories or meanings can exist.
Another source of new understandings comes from the work of current femi-
nist primatologists who are interpreting non-human primate lives in different
ways than did their predecessors. For example, focuses include ”dual-career
mothering” of females and an emphasis on the multiple roles both sexes play.3
What is important here is that, like their predecessors, these new feminist pri-
matologists also socially construct aspects of the lives of the animals they study.
Therefore, whether a de construction or a re construction, these stories about
other primates (and any other subject animals in science) are still constructions.
But are some stories better than others? Haraway obviously thinks so. As a
feminist, she prefers the work of feminist primatologists who, by emphasizing
different themes, are destabilizing traditional primatology. But so did Sherwood
Washburn, a post World War II primatologist; he saw an opportunity to combat
racism and xenophobia and to use the knowledge gleaned from primate studies
to enhance communication. Haraway later criticizes his work perhaps because
she felt that his work became misguided, but so too may the work of the new
crop of feminist primatologists.
Does Haraway believe, then, in the progress of knowledge? Or only in the
certainty of change? If she did believe in scientific progress, it would be highly
ironic. She has written that the ”ideology of progress makes the sciences seem
like wilderness preservation areas of the mind, free from the ravages of human
culture and history.” ( 1989, p. 125) By putting science and the concept of
wilderness, for example, outside of human experience and culture, we can see
ourselves as forever progressing in our understandings of the world. Hence, as
Berman notes:
Modern consciousness thus regards the thinking of previous ages not
simply as other legitimate forms of consciousness, but as misguided
world views that we have happily outgrown. It holds that the men
and women of those times though t they understood nature, but
without our scientific sophistication their beliefs could not help but
be childish and animistic. (1981, pp. 57-8)
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The ideology of progress is a trap not only for science but also for those who
would deconstruct science. Implied in some criticisms of objectivity (and thus
of those fools who dared to search for ”truth”) is that somehow the decon-
structionists themselves are on their own self-righteous path to truths, perhaps
of a different sort, but truths nonetheless. Therefore one must ask: After her
deconstruction of primatology, does Haraway (who, after all, was trained as a
biologist) also believe that there are some underlying truths waiting to be found
by the enlightened?
The tradition of deconstruction, from my reading, continually tries to assert
that there is no such thing as ”truth,” that life is like an onion, where we keep
peeling off layers to find eventually that there is no core. Noske describes the
work of Barbara McClintock who noted that ”modern science can give us at
most only pieces of nature. But nature is so vast and complex that ‘anything
you can think of, you will find.’” ( 1989, p. 52) Theoretically, then, we can
construct myriad stories.
Such a concept is particularly difficult for someone like myself who has had some
experience with non-human animals. I suspect that there are limits to what we
can ”make up” and that it is pretty hard to misconstrue some aspects of our or
other lives. For example, you’d be hard pressed to misidentify someone giving
birth. That is not to say that how you describe the event, like ”excruciatingly
painful,” wouldn’t be colored by your cultural expectations.
For me, then, studying other animals and our relationships with them requires
a balancing act. While recognizing that our observations will be colored by
our expectations, we ought not forego trying to understand these Others. As
Haraway advocates in this evocative passage:
Inheritors of their own history, and natural history, there is no way
for westerners to participate innocently in ”reinventing” nature in
a world untouched by western hegemony. Western forms of love
and knowledge of nature have been profoundly colonial; knowledge
of how that has been so cannot be allowed to degenerate into an
excuse for losing an historical capacity to know, love, and act in
relation to the strange and dynamic category still somehow able
to be called ”nature.” If it once was, nature is no longer simply a
western epistemological and social imposition. Like other languages
of the colonizer that have been reinvented for other conversations,
the languages of nature have become polyglot and international.
Rather than loss of innocence being an excuse for not participating
in these life and death conversations, this loss is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for taking part usefully. (1989, p. 274)
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Situated Knowledges and Partial Perspectives
For Haraway, one path away from this conundrum is through ”situated knowl-
edges.” When we talk about our relations with Others, we can only speak from
where we are, from our own experiences, and we must recognize that our voices
represent only a ”partial perspective” which will contribute to the ”multiplicity
of voices.”4 This multiplicity of voices may help us better understand the wide
array of relationships we experience with other animals; universality, however,
then becomes a dubious concept. Raymond Williams, in his insightful essay,
”Ideas of Nature,” writes:
I am prepared to believe that one or other of the consequent general-
izations [of Nature] may be more true than the rest, may be a better
way of looking at the process in which we also are involved and on
which we can be said to depend. But I am bound to say I would feel
in closer touch with the real situation if the observations...were not
so speedily gathered...into singular statements of essential, inherent
and immutable characteristics; into principles of a singular nature.
(1980, p. 70)
Yet universality seems to be something many of us crave. As Lewontin explains:
If one’s message is that things are complicated, uncertain, and messy,
that no simple rule or force will explain the past and predict the
future of human existence, there are rather fewer ways to get that
message across. Measured claims about the complexity of life... are
not show biz. (1991, p. vii)
To say that we crave universal truths may be an understatement: I think many
of us fear a world without them. For example, I once had someone ask me,
with what I perceived to be an air of incredulity, whether I could live with the
cacophony and chaos created by the ”multiplicity of voices.” I can. As someone
who doesn’t feel that my way of experiencing the world has been described by
the dominant theories that claim universality, the opportunity to add my voice
to the fray is highly attractive.
For what is true for me today may not be true for me forever and may not be
true for someone else. Let me finish with a story to illustrate my point. One
day my husband and I were walking through the forests of the Tanjung Puting
Reserve in Indonesian Borneo where we happened to meet the daughter of an
ex-captive rehabilitant orangutan, Siswi. She maneuvered me out of the way
and commenced to walk down the path beside John, leaving me tagging along
behind. She held his hand, wrestled with him, did a few genital-displaying
headstands and absolutely ignored me. (Having had considerable contact with
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humans, Siswi appears to be unconcerned about the species boundary and seems
to be quite attracted to human men.) Had we encountered Siswi separately on
that day, our descriptions of her may have been quite different. And had I
based my understandings of Siswi solely on this one encounter, it would have
been faulty; subsequently Siswi and I spent a few hours sitting quietly together.
She was not some passive object who would behave in exactly the same way
every time with every person. Rather, she was an active participant in the
building of our relationships with her; she had agency.
Our relationships with the many Others do matter. We must remember the
importance of context, of place, and of grounding our knowledge in experience
in our attempts to understand other animals and our relationships to them.
Notes
1. For example, Charles Bergman opens his 1990 book, Wild Echoes, with this
quotation.
2. I would add that all animals are part of cultures as well. The notion that non-
human animals might have their own cultures is a difficult one for many people
to accept. Rather, it is generally only humans who are thought to have the
ability to socially construct their worlds. Noske writes: ”So far little attention
has been paid (and least of all by mainstream science) to the possibility that it
is not just human subjects who socially and collectively construct their world
but that animal subjects may do so too. These animal constructs are likely to
be markedly different from our but may be no less real.” ( 1989, p. 158)
3. This research, however, has itself been criticized for emphasizing white,
middle-class feminist concerns like balancing career and parenting roles.
4. See the chapter, ”Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” in Haraway (1991).
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